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Abstract 
We reinvestigate a version of the beauty contest originally developed by Keynes (1936) with a 
focus on cognitive reflection. Using a sample of 166 undergraduate students at a regional 
university in Florida, we confirm previous research by Burnham et al. (2009) that cognitive 
reflection, as measured by Frederick’s (2005) cognitive reflection test, matters in the first round 
of the game; players  with a higher CRT score pick significantly lower numbers, and their 
responses cluster more. Unlike previous research, however, we find that cognitive ability is 
important only when faced with a new situation. In subsequent rounds of the game, cognitive 
ability is subordinate to a learning effect and players’ responses and the variability of responses 
are not significantly related to CRT scores. This finding is important in financial markets, since it 
implies that anticipating the decisions and actions of other players is a function of experience, 
not necessarily cognitive ability.  
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Introduction 
The beauty contest was first discussed numerically by Moulin (1986), although it was 
introduced originally by Keynes (1936). In this contest, players choose a number between 0 and 
100. The winning entry is the one closest to a given percentage (most often 2/3) of the mean 
choice of players. The Nash equilibrium of this game is that everyone chooses 0. Typical 
experiments, however, show that the typical winning entry is about 17 (see, for example, Thaler 
1998, Nagel 1995). Montier (2010) references this game as well to illustrate how difficult it is to 
incorporate everybody else’s decision making process into your own. Also recently, Burnham et 
al. (2009) utilized a cognitive test to see if the cognitive ability of an individual is associated with 
the response in the Beauty Contest. They found that higher cognitive ability improves the 
performance in the Beauty Contest game. This paper complements and expands their research 
since it uses a cognitive test in the selected group of subjects but it assesses whether the 
cognitive ability holds in repeated games. This paper shows that, similarly to Burnham et al. 
(2009), cognitive ability is important in the first round of the game, but once the game is played 
repeatedly this advantage disappears. This result adds a very important dimension to behavioral 
economics since it indicates that cognitive ability can be important when dealing with new 
situations, while repeating interaction creates a feedback mechanism for participants that can 
reduce the effect of any advantage in cognitive ability. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The hypotheses are presented in 
next. The data is presented in the third section, followed by the results. The paper concludes and 
presents some implications in the last section.  
 
Hypotheses 
Individuals tend to think in either an X System or a C System. The X System represents 
the emotional approach to decision making, while the C System is a more logical way of 
processing information. The C System is deliberate, deductive, and logical, while the X System 
is automatic and effortless. Klein (1999) summarizes the conditions under which people are more 
likely to use the more automatic system
4
: 
 When the problem is ill structured and complex 
 When information is incomplete, ambiguous, and changing 
 When the goals are ill-defined, shifting, or competing 
 When stress is high, because either time constrains and/or high stakes are involved 
 When decisions rely upon an interaction with others 
The highlighted areas are present in the numerical beauty contest. Clearly information is 
incomplete, since no player knows how the other players will play the game. Moreover, the 
optimal decision for a player depends on the expectations about the other players’ play of the 
game. In addition, if we view the numerical beauty contest as a corollary to the stock market, 
playing the stock market game (i.e., guessing the price everybody else is willing to pay for a 
stock) results in high stress because a trader’s job may require swift execution and/or substantial 
amounts of money.  
 Given this context, it stands to reason that most people will use System X in order to play 
the numerical beauty contest. Frederick (2005) developed a Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) 
consisting of three questions, which can easily be used to measure the ability of the C-System to 
control the X-System. Montier (2010) elaborates: “I’ve found that the number of Frederick’s 
questions that you get correct correlated with your general vulnerability to a whole plethora of 
other behavioral biases….Those who get zero questions right seem to suffer more pronounced 
examples of the biases than those who get three questions right.” Burnham et al. (2009) used a 
cognitive ability test developed by the company Assessio, which is consistent with the test that 
we use in our experiment. 
 We expect that those contestants that answer more questions correctly on the CRT will 
play the game differently than those who answer zero or only one question on the test correctly. 
Specifically, the CRT was designed to assess a specific cognitive ability; it assesses individuals' 
ability to suppress an intuitive and spontaneous ("system X") wrong answer in favor of a 
reflective and deliberative ("system C") right answer.
5
 In the remaining discussion, we will use 
the terms “cognitive ability” and “cognitive reflection” alternative to refer to this intended 
meaning of the CRT test. In the context of the beauty contest, it stands to reason that C-System 
users will pick numbers that are closer to the Nash equilibrium of zero, since they are likely to 
reason more through the thinking that the contestants will follow. This hypothesis is also 
informed by the empirical results provided by Burnham et al. (2009). 
 
                                                          
4
  Also summarized in Montier (2010).  
5
  Obrecht, Chapman, and Gelman (2007), for example, find that higher CRT scores are correlated with mean 
differences in comfort with statistical concepts; Pinillos et al (2011) find that taking the CRT and answering 
questions correctly activates System C processes for subsequent tasks.    
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H1: C-System users will pick lower numbers than X-System users in the contest.  
 Furthermore, if System C users think through the reasoning of other players to a greater 
extent, then it stands to reason that their responses will be closer together. Consequently, we 
hypothesize that the standard deviation of their responses will be lower: 
H2: C-System user responses will be more clustered and exhibit a lower standard deviation. 
Given the empirical results regarding the better performance of subjects with higher 
cognitive ability, we want to explore whether this advantage holds in repeated instances of the 
game. To do that, we have the same group of subjects play this game two more times.  
Accordingly, our third hypothesis is, 
H3: C-System user responses will be consistently lower than X-System users responses in further 
rounds of the game. 
 
Data 
 To conduct the contest, we utilized students in an introductory business undergraduate 
course at a regional university in Florida. Students were asked to answer Frederick’s (2005) three 
CRT questions as well as the numerical beauty contest question, which are reproduced in the 
Appendix. In the first round, 166 students participated in the survey.  
 After the first round, students were shown the distribution of answers as in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Round 1 Answers in the Beauty Contest. 
 
  
Students were also told the average and winning entry. No additional information was 
provided.
6
 Students were then told that the contest would be played again
7
 and, while anyone 
was welcome to play and anyone could win, the distribution and winning number would be 
                                                          
6
  In this environment we wanted to reflect market situations as accurately as possible. In any normal 
financial market operation, market participants make their decisions, observe the results, and then use that 
information as feedback for their decision next time. 
7
  Camerer and Ho (2000) find that the responses converge to the Nash equilibrium of zero after about 10 
rounds.  
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based only on the distribution of those students who participated in the contest the first time.
8
 We 
added this requirement so that the students who participate in both rounds adjust their play of the 
game only in response to others playing the game repeatedly, not to newcomers to the game who 
have not had a chance to “learn” how to play the game. 94 students participated in the second 
round. 
Students were then told that the contest would be conducted a third time. Students were 
presented with the distributions of the first two rounds (Figures 1 and 2) and the averages in each 
round. Again students were told that anyone could play and win, but the distribution that 
determines the winner would be based only on those students who played both previous rounds. 
Seventy students participated in the third round.  
 
Figure 2. Distribution of Round 2 Answers in the Beauty Contest. 
 
 
 As compensation for participating in the survey, students in each round were offered a 
quiz question should they win the contest.
9
 
 
 
                                                          
8
  We added this requirement to observe how the students that participated in the first round would play the 
game in subsequent rounds.  
9
  A quiz in the class is worth about 2.5%, with about seven questions per quiz. Simple math shows that this is 
a very small incentive for participating in the study. Moreover, we did not provide any incentive for answering the 
CRT questions correctly. This is because we wanted to identify whether students are natural System X or System C 
thinkers. Our results reveal that those who spend more time on answering the questions on the CRT correctly adjust 
the answers to the beauty contest more, which is exactly what we predicted. If all participating students simply 
provided random answers (because the incentive is not high enough), then we would expect the answer to the CRT 
and the beauty contest to be uncorrelated. We acknowledge that there is a selection bias that may cause random 
correlation between the beauty contest and the CRT results if only some of the students provide random answers.  
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Results 
The distribution of numbers picked for all three rounds is shown in Figures 1 through 3.  
 
Figure 3. Distribution of Round 3 Answers in the Beauty Contest. 
 
 
 
A comparison of the figures clearly indicates that the range of numbers has decreased 
across the two rounds. In round 1, the average number picked was 32.05, which made the 
winning entry 21. In round 2, the average number picked was 20.26, which rendered the winning 
number 14. In the third round, the average number picked was 10.81, with a winning entry of 7
10
. 
In round 1, three students picked the number 21, while seven students picked the winning 
number in round 2 and eight students picked the winning number in the third round. The 
convergence of the answers toward the Nash equilibrium of zero in later rounds corresponds to 
the findings of Camerer and Ho (2000).   
Descriptive statistics from Frederick’s (2005) Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) are shown 
in Table 1. Panel A shows the results for the combined results from all three rounds. As is 
evident from Panel A, the average number picked is lower for students who answer more 
questions correctly on the CRT. For example, while the average (median) number picked for 
students who answered no questions on the CRT correctly is 28.90 (23.00) in all three rounds of 
the beauty contest, the average (median) number picked for those students who answered all 
questions on the CRT correctly is 21.34 (17.00). The difference in the numbers picked between 
those who answered none of the questions correctly versus those who answered them all 
correctly is significant (p-value = 0.015). There is also a decrease in the standard deviation of 
answers across the categories; for those answering no questions on the CRT correctly, the 
standard deviation of numbers picked is almost 20, while it is slightly less than 15 for those 
answering all questions on the CRT correctly. This difference in variances is highly significant 
(p-value = .005). 
                                                          
10
  All these averages are statistically different from each other. We run a t-test for unpaired samples with 
different variance and the averages are statistically different at 99.5% of confidence. 
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 Panel B of Table 1 shows the results for round 1 only, Panel C shows the results for 
round 2 only, and Panel D shows the results for Round 3 only.  P-values for tests of differences 
in means and variances are presented in Panel E. Within each round, the average and median 
numbers picked decrease consistently as students are more reflective on the CRT test,
11
 although 
the result is much less pronounced in Round 3 of the game. Some of the differences in means in 
Panel E are statistically significant for different CRT scores in round 1, but most are not 
significant in rounds 2 and 3.  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Frederick’s Cognitive Reflection Test in Both Rounds. 
Panel A – All Rounds 
Questions 
Correct 
Frequency Avg. Number 
Picked 
Median Number 
Picked 
Std. Deviation of 
Answer 
0 94 28.90 23.00 19.73 
1 64 23.36 20.00 18.62 
2 78 22.60 17.00 17.29 
3 94 21.34 17.00 14.71 
Total 330 24.18 18.00 17.80 
Panel B – Round 1 
Questions 
Correct 
Frequency Avg. Number 
Picked 
Median Number 
Picked 
Std. Deviation of 
Answer 
0 51 38.12 33.30 21.29 
1 28 31.48 28.50 19.85 
2 41 29.43 28.00 19.84 
3 46 28.00 25.75 15.60 
Total 166 32.05 28.00 19.53 
Panel C – Round 2 
Questions 
Correct 
Frequency Avg. Number 
Picked 
Median Number 
Picked 
Std. Deviation of 
Answer 
0 25 21.48 21.00 10.43 
1 19 23.26 21.00 17.91 
2 21 20.10 17.00 8.79 
3 29 17.36 16.00 11.16 
Total 94 20.26 17.00 12.21 
Panel D – Round 3 
Questions 
Correct 
Frequency Avg. Number 
Picked 
Median Number 
Picked 
Std. Deviation of 
Answer 
0 18 13.07 13.00 6.43 
1 17 10.12 8.00 6.13 
2 16 8.40 8.50 5.47 
3 19 11.32 9.00 8.39 
Total 70 10.81 9.00 6.83 
  
                                                          
11
  The only exception to this is 2 and 3 questions correct for round 3. 
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Panel E – p-Values for Tests of Different Averages and Variances with Respect to CRT Score 
CRT 
Scores 
Round 1 
Average 
Round 2 
Average 
Round 3 
Average  
Round 1 
Variance 
Round 2 
Variance 
Round 3 
Variance 
0 vs 1 
0.1707 0.7018 0.1741 0.7075 0.0143** 0.8555 
0 vs 2 
0.0463** 0.6275 0.0288** 0.6506 0.4414 0.5340 
0 vs 3 
0.0085*** 0.1667 0.4798 0.0363** 0.7427 0.2771 
1 vs 2 
0.6756 0.4912 0.4005 0.9810 0.0028*** 0.6609 
1 vs 3 
0.4330 0.2101 0.6257 0.1505 0.0239** 0.2129 
2 vs 3 
0.7114 0.2254 0.3369 0.1185 0.2733 0.0993* 
*  Significant at the 10% level 
**  Significant at the 5% level 
***  Significant at the 1% level 
 
Similarly, the standard deviation of answers picked is smaller for students who reflect 
more on the answers they provide in round 1 and, to a lesser extent, round 2. By round 3, the 
answers from more reflective students tend to have a higher standard deviation.  
The results for round 2 presented in Panel C of Table 1 are less obvious. The average and 
median numbers decrease for students who scored higher on the CRT, but this trend is less 
pronounced than for the first round of the contest. The insignificant results of the t-tests, in Panel 
E of Table 1, corroborate this result. Similarly, while it appears that the standard deviation is 
decreasing slightly for students with higher CRT scores, the evidence is less convincing in this 
round; even though it does appear that the variance decreases between students answering one 
question correctly versus those answering two or three questions correctly, the variance for those 
students answering one question on the CRT correctly is significantly greater than the variance 
for those answering none correctly.  
The results for round 3 presented in Panel D of Table 1 are very similar to the round 2 
results, with one important difference. Students who scored very high on the CRT appear to both 
pick higher numbers and exhibit a higher variance than those who scored lower.  
 The results presented in Table 1 suggest that the level of reflection that students exhibit is 
a rather pronounced predictor of student responses in the first round of the contest. This makes 
sense, as a higher level of reflection or reasoning will lead students to pick a lower number. It 
also makes sense that this group of students will give responses that cluster more than students 
who are more impulsive, leading to a lower variance in their responses. As the contest progresses 
into subsequent rounds, however, it appears that the results on the CRT test become a less useful 
predictor of student responses as well as the variance of responses. In other words, in later 
rounds there is a less pronounced difference between those students who think impulsively 
versus reflectively as measured by the CRT.  
 To further investigate whether the CRT results can be used to predict performance in the 
beauty contest, we next classify students into System X (impulsive) versus System C (reflective) 
groups. The System X group contains those students with either 0 or 1 answers correct on the 
CRT, while the System C group contains those students with either 2 or 3 answers correct on the 
CRT.  We then repeat the analysis from Table 1 for these two groups.  
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 The results from the analysis of System X and System C groups are presented in Table 2. 
As in Table 1, the combined results for rounds 1 and 2 are presented in Panel A, while round 1 
and round 2 results are presented in Panels B and C, respectively. As shown in the third line of 
Panel A, the difference in the average and median number picked between System X and System 
C users is significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Moreover, the difference in the 
standard deviation of answers is significant at the 5% level. This indicates that System C users, 
on average, pick lower numbers and exhibit less variability in their answers than System X users 
across all three rounds of the contest. 
 
Table 2. System X and C Descriptive Statistics in Both Rounds. 
Panel A – All Rounds 
System Frequency Avg. Number 
Picked 
Median Number 
Picked 
Std. Deviation of 
Answer 
X 158 26.66 22.50 19.42 
C 172 21.91 17.00 15.90 
Difference          4.75***       5.50**       3.52** 
 
Panel B – Round 1 
System Frequency Avg. Number 
Picked 
Median Number 
Picked 
Std. Deviation of 
Answer 
X 79 35.77 32.00 20.91 
C 87 28.67 27.00 17.64 
Difference         7.10***         5.00***   3.27 
 
Panel C – Round 2 
System Frequency Avg. Number 
Picked 
Median Number 
Picked 
Std. Deviation of 
Answer 
X 44 22.25 21.00 13.97 
C 50 18.51 17.00 10.24 
Difference      3.74*     4.00*       3.73** 
 
Panel D – Round 3 
System Frequency Avg. Number 
Picked 
Median Number 
Picked 
Std. Deviation of 
Answer 
X 35 11.63 9.00   6.37 
C 35 9.98 9.00   7.26 
Difference  1.65 0.00 -0.89 
*  Significant at the 10% level 
**  Significant at the 5% level 
***  Significant at the 1% level 
 
 Panel B shows the results from round 1. For the average number picked and the median 
number picked, the difference between X and C System users is highly significant, but the 
difference in the standard deviation of answers is not significant. Thus, while more reflective 
students apparently pick lower numbers, they do not seem to cluster more. The round 2 results in 
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Panel C show less convincing results for the average and median number picked. The respective 
difference between X and C System users of 3.74 and 4.00 is only significant at the 10% level. In 
round 2, however, the standard deviation of answers is significantly higher for the more 
impulsive System X users. 
 Panel C, showing the results from round 3 of the contest, illustrates that the CRT test 
results become even less important in subsequent rounds. Neither the average numbers picked, 
the medians, nor the standard deviations differ at conventional significance levels.  
 The results from Table 1 and 2 combined provide strong evidence that more reflective 
students pick lower numbers in the beauty contest, particularly in the first round of the contest, 
than the more impulsive students. Moreover, at the extreme ends of the CRT (0 versus 3 
questions correct), there is a significant difference in the variability of answers, with the more 
reflective students’ answers clustering more. While this difference in the standard deviation of 
responses is not observed in the extreme cases in the second round of the contest, it is observable 
when System X and System C are classified as (0, 1) and (2, 3) CRT questions correct, 
respectively. In round 3 of the contest, however, the differences are not significant for either 
System X or System C users or for the extreme cases. 
 As an additional test of the relationship between the number picked and the responses on 
the CRT, we performed a regression analysis. We pool the results from the three rounds and we 
also present a regression individualizing each round with a different variable. As a result, we ran 
three simple OLS regressions using the number picked as the dependent variable and the number 
of correct CRT responses as the independent variable. The regression results are displayed in 
Table 3. 
 The columns in Table 3 show the regression results for the three rounds of the beauty 
contest combined in one variable (Round) and another variable representing the score in the CRT 
test (CRT Test). Model 1 regresses the number picked on Round and on dummy variables of the 
CRT score in each round. Model 2 regresses the number picked on Round and on CRT Test. In 
both models, the results show that the coefficient of the variable Round is negative, which 
indicates that the score drops strongly in every successive round. Of particular interest is the 
coefficient of the variable CRT Test in Model 2, which indicates that the number picked 
decreases by about 2.307 for each additional question answered correctly on the CRT, on 
average. However, for each additional round played, the average number picked decreases by 
10.7 points. This implies that, given that the initial average number was 32.05, it should take 
about four rounds to reach convergence to zero. This result implies that the learning effect, 
playing an extra round, is stronger than the cognitive effect, a higher score in the cognitive 
ability test. This importance of the learning effect is also reflected in the quite substantial 
adjusted r-squared of .25 for the pooled regression. For each round individually, the adjusted r-
squared is a maximum of only .04 for the round 1 regression. 
If we run the same regressions but with different variables for the CRT score in each 
separate round (Model 1), these results are even more telling.  The variables labeled 
CRT*Roundi (i=1,2,3) represents a variable that contains the CRT test scores for each separate 
round, i. The results show that the CRT test score was highly significant (-3.23) in round 1, 
marginally significant in round 2 (-1.01) and statistically insignificant in round 3.  This implies 
that subjects with a higher cognitive result will enjoy a strong initial advantage. In the second 
and third rounds of the game the coefficient for the cognitive test is not as significant, confirming 
the weaker results for these rounds from Tables 1 and 2. This also reflects the results from the 
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pooled regression regarding the importance of experience compared to cognitive knowledge in 
repeated games. 
Table 3. Regression Results Using CRT Answers to Predict Beauty Contest Scores (t values in 
parentheses). 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 
CRT*Round1       -3.23*** 
(-3.31) 
 
CRT*Round2     -1.01** 
(-2.01) 
 
CRT*Round3 -0.11 
(0.22) 
 
CRT Test         -2.31*** 
 (-3.20) 
Round     -12.87*** 
(-7.36) 
      -10.73*** 
(-10.04) 
Constant       49.62*** 
(15.25) 
       46.03*** 
 (20.18) 
 Adj. R2: 0.25 
F-test: 28.64   Pr. = 0.000 
Number of Observations: 330 
Adj. R2: 0.25 
F-test: 55.98 Pr. = 0.000 
Number of Observations: 330 
*  Significant at the 10% level 
**  Significant at the 5% level 
***  Significant at the 1% level 
 
 The results indicate that the initial responses students provide may be influenced by the 
system they use to analyze the information. Moreover, it also appears that the learning that takes 
place between rounds of the contest may not be influenced by the cognitive system employed by 
students. Indeed, if we define “learning” as the adjustment in responses between the two rounds, 
we find that “learning” for System X users is 12.83, while it is 10.64 for System C. The 
difference of 2.19 is not significant (p-value = 0.29) and neither is the difference in variances in 
“learning” (p-value = 0.82). The findings for “learning” between rounds 2 and 3 are virtually 
identical, with a System X user average of 10.31, and a System C user average of 9.17 (p-value 
of difference test equals 0.34), with an insignificant difference in variances (p-value = 0.77).  
Conclusion and Discussion 
Overall, it seems that students’ initial response is, perhaps, influenced by the cognitive 
system students use; more reflective students put more thought into the answer they provide and 
the answer is therefore closer to the Nash equilibrium of zero. That is, System C users’ responses 
are closer to the “textbook” answer and, at least in the extremes, these students’ responses cluster 
more than those of their more impulsive counterparts. It does not appear, however, that either 
System C or System X users adjust their responses faster, and there is much less convincing 
evidence that the two groups differ in their responses and the variability of their responses in 
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subsequent rounds of the contest.  In this small setting, adjustment of responses in a beauty 
contest does not appear to be influenced by cognitive reflection as measured by the CRT.
12
 
We confirm previous research by Burnham et al. (2009), which illustrates the importance 
of cognitive reflection in games like the beauty contest, where the answer depends on the answer 
other players will provide. Unlike previous literature, however, we find that cognitive reflection 
is only important in the initial stage of a game, when the players are playing for the first time. 
This indicates that cognitive ability is important only when faced with a new situation. In 
subsequent rounds of the game, a player’s cognitive ability does not influence the rate of 
response adjustment.  
Our findings are important in any market, especially financial markets, since they imply 
that interaction with other market participants is more important than simple cognitive ability the 
longer one participates in the market; anticipating the decisions and actions of other players is a 
function of experience, not necessarily cognitive ability. A possible extension to the present 
paper would be to see if individuals’ trading behavior in financial markets varies based on their 
CRT results, which may confirm the previous conjecture. We would expect individuals with 
more extensive trading experience to more successfully incorporate other market participants’ 
actions, whether their CRT scores are high or low. At this point, we can only speculate as to the 
relevance of our findings in the financial markets, but our results could be tested in that setting.  
The question that remains to be answered is whether cognitive or impulsive users are 
better at incorporating other players’ choices into their decision-making process. While System 
C users pick answers initially that are closer to the theoretical equilibrium of zero, this will not 
help them “win” the contest unless most of the other players are also System C users or unless 
they correctly predict, using reflection, how the other users in the contest play the game.  
An interesting follow-up study would be to ask students directly whether they believe the 
other participants are impulsive or reflective. That is, how much noise do the participants expect 
to encounter when they play the game? Perhaps some evidence that System C users can play the 
game fairly well in round 1 comes from the observation that two of the three winners in the first 
round are classified as System C.  In round 2, however, only two out of seven winners are 
classified as System C.  The other winners are the “lucky” noise traders.  
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Appendix 
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much does 
the ball cost?  
2. If it takes five machines five minutes to make five widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets?  
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover 
half the lake?  
4. Pick a number from the range 0 to 100. The winner will be the person who picks the 
number closest to two-thirds of the average number picked.  
 
